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Abstract. This paper presents an economic model of an epidemic in which
susceptible individuals may engage in costly social distancing in order to avoid
becoming infected. Infected individuals eventually recover and acquire immunity,
thereby ceasing to be a source of infection to others. Under non-cooperative and
forward-looking decision making, equilibrium social distancing arises endogenously
around the peak of the epidemic, when disease prevalence reaches a critical thresh-
old determined by preferences. Spontaneous, uncoordinated social distancing thus
acts to atten the curve of the epidemic by reducing peak prevalence. In equilib-
rium, social distancing stops once herd immunity sets in, but acts to extend the
duration of the epidemic beyond the benchmark of a non-behavioral epidemiologi-
cal model. Comparative statics with respect to the model parameters indicate that
the curve becomes atter (i) the more infectious the disease is and (ii) the more
severe the health consequences of the disease are for the individuals.
JEL Classification: C73, I18.
Keywords: Economic epidemiology, social distancing, non-pharmaceutical inter-
ventions, infection control.
...[the Black Death made people] shun and ee from the sick and all that pertained to
them, and thus doing, each thought to secure immunity for himself.
- Boccaccios The Decameron (1353)
1. Introduction
The world is currently gripped by the COVID-19 pandemic. At the time of writing,
there is no vaccine available against this virus and no antiviral therapies to increase the
speed of recovery. The only available strategies to stem the spread of the disease are
behavioral interventions such as social distancing. Social distancing refers to any non-
pharmaceutical intervention, taken by individuals or by policy makers, which acts to
decrease the contact rate between infected and susceptible individuals.1 Reducing the
Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. Email: fmot2@cam.ac.uk.
yGenerous feedback from Harjoat Bhamra, Frederick Chen, Eli Fenichel, Chryssi Giannitarou, Robert
Rowthorn and Anthony Yates is gratefully acknowledged.
1When social distancing is imposed on a sub-population by a government, it is often referred to as
quarantines; when it is voluntary and chosen by individuals themselves, it is known as self-isolation.
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contact rate is often held to be the central tool to atten the curve, i.e. to reduce
disease incidence and hence the number of infected individuals. In some countries such
as the United Kingdom, governments have refrained from directly imposing restrictions
on individuals and have instead appealed to citizens to act in the interests of society and
to voluntarily withdraw from the public space. The question is then, when left to their
own devices, how much social distancing will there be in equilibrium? And how does
this depend on biological and preference parameters? The United Kingdoms response to
the COVID-19 pandemic and the scientic research underlying it is heavily predicated on
behavior changes that reduce the contact rate in the population (see Ferguson et al., 2020,
Ferguson et al. 2006 and Halloran et a., 2008). The overwhelming focus of governments
responses to the epidemic on behavioral responses of the population makes it incumbent
upon researchers to be clear about how and why individuals act as the epidemic unfolds.
What are their constraints and incentives? Will they voluntarily comply with directions
given by public health o¢ cials or do governments need to compel certain behaviors, as
has now been seen across the world?
On current evidence, much of the thinking around social distancing is based on epi-
demiological simulations and modeling that eschew a nuanced analysis of human behavior
in the face of epidemics. Specically, most of the modeling is based on assumptions about
how individuals will behave under a set of interventions such as travel restrictions, school
closures and bans on sporting and cultural events and mass gatherings. But since behav-
ior is the central issue, we must be careful about how we model it and strive to incorporate
behavioral considerations more fully into our analysis of disease control. We cannot sim-
ply rely on traditional analyses that do not model behavior but augment these with
ad-hoc interventions that rely on guesses about compliance rates. The standard epidemi-
ological models are an excellent starting point for analysis, but must be made complete
by fully integrating them with more sophisticated models of human decision-making and
behavior. Empirical evidence shows that individuals indeed respond to disease outbreaks
by changing behavior (see e.g. Kumar et al. 2012, Bayham et al., 2015, Bayham and
Fenichel, 2016 and references therein).
Lauren Gardner, a public health expert and modeler of epidemics at Johns Hopkins,
recently stated that
When people change their behavior, [epidemiological] model parameters are no longer
applicable.2
In other words, we must revisit the traditional models to fully account for human
behavior. This paper is a contribution towards this goal.
This paper analyzes social distancing by means of a continuous-time, innite-horizon
2https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/13/us/coronavirus-deaths-estimate.html?referringSource=articleShare
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economic-epidemiological model of an infectious disease. A closed population of indi-
viduals face a disease of the susceptible-infected-removed variety, which is an appropri-
ate setting for analyzing the spread of COVID-19.3 At each instant, individuals non-
cooperatively decide whether to engage in costly social distancing and in doing so, trade
o¤ the benets of social interactions against the risk of contracting the communicable
disease.
I nd that each individuals optimal strategy is described succinctly in terms of a
threshold infection probability, which depends on aggregate disease prevalence. For suf-
ciently low disease prevalence, as may be found at the beginning or the end of an
epidemic, the risks from social interactions are small and thus individuals choose not to
socially distance themselves. For higher levels of disease prevalence, the risk of exposure
may outweigh the benets and so individuals switch to social distancing. In this case,
aggregate equilibrium disease prevalence remains constant through time until su¢ ciently
many individuals have gone through the cycle susceptible ! infected ! recovered to
cause disease prevalence to fall without further social distancing. In a sense, individuals
equilibrium social distancing decisions act as a ow rate regulator between healthy and
recovered individuals, where the underlying uncontrolled ow rates are determined by
the biological features of the disease.
The analysis emphasizes that while the equilibrium extent of social distancing is not
socially optimal, aggregate equilibrium infection across the epidemic is lower than what
a traditional non-economic epidemiological analysis would suggest. In other words, a
purely non-behavioral model would tend to overstate the severity of the epidemic relative
to one that features rational behavior. While this by no means implies that equilibrium
is socially optimal, it does mean that the worst-case scenario under a laissez-faire policy
is not that predicted by purely biological considerations.4
To further contrast the predictions of the economic model with those of a purely epi-
demiological model, I characterize the equilibrium dynamics in terms of several properties
of the aggregate disease dynamics, namely in terms of peak prevalence, duration and -
nal size distribution. I nd that equilibrium social distancing will tend to reduce peak
prevalence, increase duration and decrease cumulative incidence, which can be thought
of as an inverse measure of herd immunity. Interestingly, I nd that the comparative
statics predictions of the of economic model are the reverse of those in the uncontrolled
epidemiological model. For example, peak prevalence and cumulative incidence are both
increasing in the infectiousness of the disease in the biological model, whereas they are
3This model is also known as that of a general epidemic. See Kermack and McKendrick (1927) for
the original treatment. Disease-induced deaths can be incorporated explicitly in the model but are not
considered in order to simplify the exposition.
4In the present model, equilibrium will not be socially optimal since individuals do not internalize
the positive externalities that ow from their decisions to socially distance themselves.
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decreasing in the economic model. This is because the endogenously determined social
distancing decisions of the individuals react to higher infectiousness by engaging in more
protective behavior.
The formal economic analysis of social distancing is sparse. Sethi (1978) analyzes the
problem of a social planner in the context of the simpler susceptible-infected-susceptible
SIS model of disease in which recovered individuals are not immune to further infection.
Chen et al. (2011), Gersovitz (2010) and Toxvaerd (2019) consider equilibrium social
distancing in the SIS model under decentralized decision-making, while Rowthorn and
Toxvaerd (2015) consider the interaction between social distancing and treatment with an-
tivirals, both in equilibrium and under central planning. Toxvaerd and Rowthorn (2020)
consider the equilibrium and socially optimal inducement of immunity via vaccination and
treatment. Reluga (2010) analyzes a di¤erential game model of social distancing with
a nite horizon, no discounting and (eventual) vaccination. Chen (2012) studies social
distancing in the susceptible-infected-recovered SIR model under more general matching
functions than the standard mass-action specication used in the epidemiological litera-
ture and nds that for some specications of the matching function, there may be scope
for multiple Nash equilibria at each point in time, making it di¢ cult to predict the course
of the epidemic.
In contrast to these papers, I consider an SIR framework in which individuals are
perfectly forward-looking but where each is small relative to a large population, thereby
side-stepping the di¢ culties involved in di¤erential games. Furthermore, in the present
setting there is a unique equilibrium path through the epidemic, allowing me not only
to predict of the course of the epidemic (within the model) but also to perform mean-
ingful comparative statics with respect to biological and preference parameters. Last,
Fenichel et al (2011) and Fenichel (2013) consider social distancing in the SIR model
when individuals have concave utility functions. Fenichel (2013) considers the properties
of decentralized equilibrium and socially optimal social distancing when susceptible, in-
fected and recovered individuals can vary their exposure levels di¤erentially. He argues
that in such a setting, a second-best policy that requires all individuals to socially distance
themselves to the same extent may be inferior to a laissez-faire policy. Here, the main
focus is on the di¤erences between the dynamics under equilibrium behavior and those
in the uncontrolled epidemiological model. In addition, the dependence of the dynamics
on preference parameters is explored and the present results are thus complementary to
his analysis.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I present the economic-epidemiological
model and briey review the classical analysis of the susceptible-infected-recovered model.
This is to set the stage for the subsequent analysis of individual decision-making and
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Figure 1: States and Flows in the SIR Model.
characterization of equilibrium dynamics under social distancing, contained in Section 3.
In Section 4, I discuss the results and conclude.
2. The Model
The model is an economic extension of the classical susceptible-infected-recovered model
and is simple to describe. Time is continuous and runs indenitely. A closed population
consists of a continuum [0; 1] of innitely lived individuals who can at each instant t  0
each be in one of three states, namely susceptible or infected or recovered. The measure
of susceptible individuals is S(t), the measure of infected (and infectious) individuals is
I(t) and the measure of recovered individuals is R(t). Because the population size is
normalized to one, these measures can be interpreted as fractions. Henceforth, I(t) shall
be referred to as disease prevalence.
At each instant, the population mixes homogeneously. This corresponds to pair-wise
random matching where each individual has an equal chance of meeting any other indi-
vidual, irrespective of the health status of the two matched individuals. A match between
an infected and a susceptible individual may infect the susceptible. The rate at which
infection is transferred in such a match, absent social distancing, is denoted by  > 0.
This parameter captures the infectivity of the disease. Recovered individuals are immune
to further infection and also cannot carry the disease. Coupled with the assumption of
homogeneous mixing, this means that the aggregate rate at which susceptible individuals
become infected is given by I(t)S(t). This means that the rate of new infection, or
disease incidence, is proportional to disease prevalence. The basic model compartments
with states and ow rates is illustrated in Figure 1.
Last, infected individuals spontaneously recover at rate   0. This means that on
aggregate, the rate at which recovery occurs is I(t). Throughout, I will maintain the
following assumption:
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Assumption 1:  >   0.
This assumption makes the analysis more interesting and will be explained below. To
model the possibility of engaging in social distancing, assume that the individuals can
a¤ect the rate of infection by controlling the rate at which they expose themselves to
infection. In particular, at each instant t  0, each individual i 2 S(t) non-cooperatively
chooses exposure level "i(t) 2 [0; 1], at personal cost (1  "i(t))c  0. E¤ectively, this re-
duces the rate of infection for the individual to "i(t)I(t). This formalization captures the
notion that, ceteris paribus, exposure is desirable. Equivalently, this means that engaging
in social distancing is costly to the individual. In this analysis, infected and recovered
(and therefore immune) individuals have no private benets from social distancing and
are assumed to not engage in any preventive e¤orts.
To complete the economic model, assume that the individuals in the susceptible,
infected and recovered classes earn ow payo¤s S , I and R respectively and discount
the future at rate  > 0. It will be assumed that
S  R  I
In contrast to most of the literature on controlled epidemics, I allow for the possibility
that S > R. This case captures the possibility of after-e¤ects, i.e. that although an
individual recovers from the disease, it may have negative long-term consequences on
health and well-being to have been infected.
In what follows, I will impose the following restriction:
Assumption 2: c < 
(+)(+)
[(+ )S   I + (=)R].
This assumption ensures that social distancing is state dependent in equilibrium.
2.1. The Epidemiological Benchmark. In this subsection, the classical SIR model
will briey reviewed. This is to help build intuition for the equilibrium analysis and to
better contrast the equilibrium dynamics with those in the uncontrolled biological model.
The dynamics of the epidemic is described by the following system of di¤erential
equations:
_S(t) =  I(t)S(t) (1)
_I(t) = I(t) [S(t)  ] (2)
_R(t) = I(t) (3)
S(t) = 1  I(t) R(t) (4)
S(0) = S0 > =; I(0) = I0; S0 + I0 = 1 (5)
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Figure 2: Dynamics of susceptible, infected and recovered in classical SIR model.
It follows from the equations that _S(t)  0 and _R(t)  0, but it turns out that the
evolution of disease prevalence I(t) is non-monotonic. The restriction that S0 > =
ensures that the epidemic can take hold in the population. With this assumption in
place, the overall behavior of the system can be described as follows. The measure of
susceptible individuals S(t) decreases over time while the measure of recovered individuals
increases over time. In contrast, the measure of infected individuals initially increases,
peaks when S(t) = = and then tends to zero. The basic evolution of the uncontrolled,
non-behavioral SIR epidemic is illustrated in Figure 2.
Let I denote the peak prevalence of the epidemic. The level I is the highest possible
disease prevalence when there is no social distancing whatsoever. Peak prevalence for the
SIR epidemic is
I  S0 + I0   

+


log


S0

(6)
The SIR model cannot be fully characterized analytically. Nevertheless, the limiting
distribution of health states can be characterized, which shall prove useful in the analysis
of the economic model below. Well-known steps lead to the central result in epidemiology
that the nal epidemic size is characterized by the equations5
S(1) = 1 R(1) = S(0) exp ( R(1)R0)  0 (7)
where R0  = is the basic rate of reproduction.
The basic rate of reproduction represents how many secondary infections are caused
5See Brauer and Castillo-Chavez (2012).
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by the insertion of a single infected individual into a fully susceptible population. The
second equation in (7) denes R(1) implicitly and the rst equation denes S(1) as the
residual, which is possible since I(1) = 0. The limiting proportions S(1) and R(1)
are easily found for particular parameterizations of the model. As is to be expected,
cumulative incidence R(1) is an increasing function of the infectivity parameter  and
a decreasing function of the rate of spontaneous recovery .
There are two important insights that follow from equation (7). First, in the limit the
disease must die out and no infected individuals remain. Second, and more importantly,
when the disease dies out, there is generically a positive measure of susceptibles remaining
in the population. This shows that what causes the disease to die out is not that there
is eventually a lack of susceptibles that can be infected. Rather, it dies out because the
measure of recovered individuals, which must grow over time, becomes so large that the
contact between infected and susceptible individuals becomes too rare for the infection
to be passed on. Infected individuals have increasingly long sequences of matches with
recovered individuals (or between themselves) and so, on expectation, will recover before
having the opportunity to pass on the infection to a susceptible individual. Thus with
increasing frequency, the chains of infection are broken. The remaining susceptible indi-
viduals are said to be protected by herd (or population) immunity as they benet from
the protection that the recovered individuals give.
The basic rate of reproduction plays a central role here. If R0 < 1, then infection
cannot take hold in the population. If R0 > 1, then infection rst ares up and then
tapers o¤. In the characterization of equilibrium social distancing, the basic rate of
reproduction will play a prominent role as well, not as an aim in itself, but as a feature
of the equilibrium dynamics.
The economic version of the model inherits a number of simplifying assumptions
from the classical model. First, there is only one disease and one level (or severity)
of infection. In particular, this rules out the possibility of superinfection by di¤erent
strains of the disease. Second, the incubation period has zero length. This means that
the moment that an individual is infected coincides with the onset of symptoms, so no
infected individual acts under the mistaken belief that he or she is susceptible. Last,
once an individual becomes infected, he or she immediately becomes infectious to other
individuals (i.e. the latency period has zero length). Relaxing any of these assumptions
constitutes possible extensions of the present work.
Last, the analysis is based on the implicitly assumption that only susceptibles ever
engage in social distancing, as strictly self-interested infected or recovered individuals
face no risks from social interactions.
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3. Equilibrium Social Distancing
In making a decision on how much preventive e¤ort to engage in, the individual must
trade o¤ the net benets of remaining susceptible (through costly prevention) and the
net benets of exposure (with its inherent risks of becoming infected). But since the
transition from infected to recovered is beyond the inuence of the individual, he or
she may treat the problem as one with only two (health) states, namely susceptible and
non-susceptible.
Let S(t) denote the set of susceptibles at time t  0. For an individual i 2 S(t),
the social distancing decision inuences his or her probability of becoming infected. Let
pi(t) 2 [0; 1] denote that probability at instant t  0. The problem to be solved by a
susceptible individual is then given by
max
"i(t)2[0;1]
Z 1
0
e t f(1  pi(t))[S   (1  "i(t))c] + pi(t)VIg dt (8)
s:t: _pi(t) = "i(t)I(t)(1  pi(t)); pi(0) = pi0 (9)
where the value of transitioning into the infected state can be calculated as6
VI =
1
+ 

I + 
R


(10)
The value can be understood as follows. Once infected, the individual experiences ow
utility I until he or she recovers. From then on, the individual earns ow utility R in
perpetuity. The recovery date is governed by a Poisson process with rate  and cannot
be inuenced by the individual.7 The value VI is simply the expected discounted lifetime
utility of an individual in the infected state. Last, observe that
lim
!0
VI =
I

; lim
!1
VI =
R

(11)
In steady state, _pi(t) = 0. Assuming that the agent has positive exposure, this means
that in steady state, either the individual has become infected at some point in time
t  0 so pi(t) = 1 (but has recovered since), or infection has died out so I(t) = 0 before
the individual became infected, in which case he or she remains susceptible in perpetuity.
Note that no individual can inuence the evolution of disease prevalence and this
is thus taken as exogenously given. Thus each individuals problem is solved on the
background of the aggregate evolution of the infectious disease. This is in turn described
6See the Appendix for the derivation.
7For equilibrium models with treatment augmented recovery, see Rowthorn and Toxvaerd (2015) for
the SIS case with no immunity and Toxvaerd and Rowthorn (2020) for the SIR case with immunity.
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by the following modied logistic growth equation, which is a function of the aggregate
social distancing e¤orts across the population of susceptibles:
_I(t) = I(t) ["(t)S(t)  ] ; "(t) 
Z
i2S(t)
I(t) 1"i(t)di (12)
Letting (t) denote the current-value costate variable, the individuals current-value
Hamiltonian is given by
H = pi(t)
1
+ 

I +


R

+(1 pi(t))[S (1 "i(t))c]+(t)"i(t)I(t)(1 pi(t)) (13)
The optimality condition, supposing that pi(t) < 1, is given by
@H
@"i(t)
= (t)I(t) + c = 0 (14)
Thus the privately optimal policy for an individual (i.e. his or her best response function)
is given by
"i(t) =
8><>:
0 for   (t)I(t) > c
" for   (t)I(t) = c
1 for   (t)I(t) < c
(15)
for any constant " 2 [0; 1]. At rst blush, this may seem like a bang-bang type solution but
as will become clear, in equilibrium the solution will have a bang-singular-bang nature.
This means that for some intervals of time (or equivalently, for some levels of disease
prevalence), the best response of individuals will be bang-bang and switch between "i (t) =
0 and "i (t) = 1. But during a phase around the peak of the epidemic, the best responses
will be a singular solution determined by the aggregate measure of susceptibles remaining
in the population.
The evolution of the current-value multiplier is given by
_(t) = (t)  @H
@pi(t)
(16)
= (t)[+ "i(t)I(t)] + [S   I + (=)R
+ 
  (1  "i(t))c] (17)
Using the indi¤erence condition (14) with the equation _(t) = 0 to eliminate (t) yields
the critical threshold of disease prevalence
I  c


S   I+(=)R+   c
 (18)
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 c  S I R
I  + + +/  + +
I +  0 0 0 0 0
Table 1: Comparative statics of peak prevalence levels.
Under Assumption 2, I 2 (0; 1).8 Now the optimal strategy of a susceptible individual
can be expressed in terms of disease prevalence as follows:
"i(t) =
8><>:
0 for I(t) > I
" for I(t) = I
1 for I(t) < I
(19)
for any constant " 2 [0; 1].
The comparative statics of the threshold value I and peak prevalence I are listed in
Table 1.
It is noteworthy that peak prevalence I for the purely biological model is increasing
in the infectiousness of the disease , while the maximum equilibrium prevalence I is
in fact decreasing in . Similarly, peak prevalence is decreasing in the recovery rate  in
the biological model but increasing in  in the economic model. Thus the economic and
the biological models o¤er sharply di¤erent predictions about how the characteristics of
the disease will inuence the course of the epidemic. That increased infectiousness will
decrease individuals incentives to self-protection is a feature also seen in the work of
Philipson and Posner (1993), Geo¤ard and Philipson (1996), Fenichel (2013) and Tox-
vaerd (2019). It can be understood as follows.
Controlling for behavior, i.e. holding behavior xed, higher infectiousness necessar-
ily leads to more infected individuals. This is intuitive and in fact what the classical
epidemiological model predicts. But in the behavioral model, behavior is not xed but
endogenously determined and changes as the environment changes. This is because the
society in the economic model is populated by utility maximising individuals who each
weigh the costs and benets of social distancing. For these individuals, as the infectious-
ness increases, social distancing becomes more attractive because exposure now leads to
a higher probability of becoming infected. As a result, individuals respond to increased
infectiousness by scaling back exposure and socially distancing themselves. On aggre-
gate, this behavioral response acts to curb disease incidence and hence decrease peak
prevalence.
8Assumption 2 ensures that I < 1. The assumption also implies the weaker condition (+ ) c <
[(+ )S   I + (=)R], which ensures that I > 0.
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3.1. No Social Distancing Scenario. Next, I turn to the characterization of the
equilibrium social distancing choices and the concomitant behavior of the dynamics of
the epidemic. There are two cases to consider, namely I < I and I  I and each
scenario will be characterized in turn. When I  I, the disease is not very serious as
seen from the perspective of individuals themselves and thus they never engage in any
social distancing. That is, disease prevalence in the uncontrolled biological model never
reaches levels that prompt individuals to engage in preventive e¤ort. The equilibrium
path of disease prevalence therefore exactly coincides with that in the classical SIR model,
with infection peaking at I. This is not a trivial case, since it highlights an important
feature of continual prevention. Namely, in this type of equilibrium, it is quite possible
that a very large proportion will become infected at some point along the way, and that
all individuals know this. The key reason for there not being an incentive to engage in
social distancing is that the intertemporal distribution of infections is su¢ ciently spread
out, i.e. the infection curve is already su¢ ciently at, such that at no given moment
is the probability of infection su¢ ciently high to merit costly prevention. In a nutshell,
what matters for prevention is the intensity of the epidemic rather than the duration of
the epidemic.
3.2. Social Distancing Scenario. In the case where I < I, equilibrium becomes
more complicated. Denote by S(t), I(t) and R(t) the paths of susceptible, infected
and recovered individuals under equilibrium social distancing and dene the following
threshold values:
t  minft  0 : I(t) = Ig (20)
t  minft  0 : S(t) = =g (21)
Disease prevalence will be dened as naturally decreasing if disease incidence is nega-
tive in the absence of social distancing. In other words, disease prevalence is naturally
decreasing when even with no preventive behaviour, there are su¢ ciently few remain-
ing susceptibles to ensure that the number of infected individuals declines. Then, the
uncontrolled epidemic becomes naturally decreasing at time et, dened implicitly by
et  minft  0 : S(t) = =g
Because social distancing induces (weakly) lower disease incidence for all t, it has to be
that I(t)  I(t). But this implies that
S(et) > S(et) = =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In other words, at the point in time at which disease prevalence on the uncontrolled
path starts decreasing, the equilibrium disease incidence would be positive (i.e. disease
prevalence would increase) were the individuals to cease social distancing. This means
that in a sense, in equilibrium social distancing prolongs the duration of the epidemic.
To use a phrase much discussed in recent policy debates, in equilibrium the individuals
will act to atten the curve out of an uncoordinated desire for self-preservation.
Equilibrium behavior can now be characterized as follows:
Proposition: If I < I, then in a symmetric equilibrium, exposure at time t  0 for
each individual i 2 S(t) is given by
"i (t) =
(

S(t)
for t 2 (t; t)
1 for t =2 (t; t) (22)
Proof: From the best response function of the individuals, it follows that if I(t) > I,
then all individuals will engage in full social distancing, thereby bringing down disease
incidence. Similarly, if I(t) < I, then all individuals will fully expose themselves to
infection, thereby increasing disease incidence. There are two cases to consider. If dis-
ease prevalence is naturally decreasing, then full exposure will continue to be optimal
indenitely. If disease prevalence is not naturally decreasing, then it will move towards
the level I. Therefore, in equilibrium, disease prevalence must remain constant until it
becomes naturally decreasing. Setting _I(t) = 0 yields the required aggregate exposure
level (and thus the individual mixing probabilities) as
"(t) =

S(t)
(23)
and the result follows 
The Proposition shows that in equilibrium, individuals engage in no social distancing
until a su¢ ciently large proportion of the population has become infected. Once it has
taken su¢ cient hold, they switch to a mixed strategy equilibrium in which they attach
increasingly high probability to no social distancing. The probability increases as the
measure of susceptibles decreases. One can view the strategy of individuals as akin to a
thermostat that switches o¤ and on as the temperature is above or below a desired level.
An immediate result of the Proposition is as follows:
Corollary: During the equilibrium social distancing phase, individuals gradually reduce
their social distancing e¤orts despite the infection probability not decreasing.
This result is noteworthy because it shows that in equilibrium, during the social dis-
tancing phase it is the measure of remaining susceptibles that determines the level of
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social distancing, not the number of infected individuals. In fact, during this plateau
phase, disease incidence stays constant at the critical threshold I and equilibrium social
distancing e¤ort decreases as the measure of susceptibles decreases. During the social
distancing phase, i.e. when the best responses are on the singular segment, e¤orts to de-
crease exposure to infection are strategic substitutes in that any individual would respond
to more social distancing by others with an increase in exposure. The mixed strategy-
singular solution nature of equilibrium during the social distancing phase is similar in
nature to the steady state equilibrium behavior in Toxvaerd (2019). In that paper, the
disease is of the susceptible-infected-susceptible variety and thus individuals cannot ob-
tain immunity. As a consequence, in steady state S(t) remains constant through time
and thus the mixed strategy weights in the singular solution are constant. In contrast,
with immunity, the measure of susceptibles must decrease over time, explaining why the
equilibrium mixing probabilities must change as time progresses and the state of the
epidemic changes.
The the equilibrium path for disease prevalence and the associated equilibrium social
distancing e¤orts are illustrated in Figure 3, which also displays the path of disease preva-
lence in the uncontrolled biological model for comparison. As can be seen in the gure,
at the early stages of the epidemic, individuals choose not to make any social distancing
e¤orts (i.e. they choose to fully expose themselves). This reects the fact that as disease
prevalence is initially very low (and thus the infection risk from exposure commensurately
small), individuals do not nd social distancing measures worthwhile. Similarly, when
the epidemic has run its course and infection has almost died out, individuals will again
opt for full exposure. But at the height of the epidemic, during the phase in which the
uncontrolled epidemic would have peaked, individuals spontaneously act and engage in
social distancing, causing a dampening e¤ect on disease incidence and prevalence.
Corollary: The equilibrium trajectory of the disease during the social distancing phase
is characterized by the system of di¤erential equations
_S(t) =  "(t)IS(t) =  


S(t)

IS(t) =  I (24)
_I(t) = 0 (25)
_R(t) = I (26)
As an aside, the model also an equilibrium in asymmetric strategies. All that is re-
quired on the equilibrium path during the social distancing phase is that on the horizontal
segment of the curve, aggregate exposure must equal "(t); it does not matter how this
comes about. Since on this segment the individuals are indi¤erent between full social
distancing and full exposure, they are willing to mix between strategies. But it is also
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Figure 3: Equilibrium disease prevalence and social distancing across stages of epidemic.
The blue curve shows disease prevalence and the red curve shows aggregate exposure.
consistent with equilibrium to have a fraction "(t) exposing themselves fully and have
the remainder (1  "(t)) fully socially distancing themselves.
For ease of comparison of disease paths between the non-controlled biological model
and the equilibrium under social distancing, Figures 4, 5 and 6 show the evolution of
individuals in each health state separately, while Figure 9 at the end of the paper shows
all the paths superimposed.
The dynamic equations in the Corollary show another interesting feature, namely
that during the social distancing phase, the measure of susceptible individuals decreases
linearly at a rate  I, while the measure of recovered individuals increases linearly at
rate I. In addition, one sees that the rates of change are proportional to the critical
threshold I. In other words, we can relate the speed of change over time during the
social distancing phase to the magnitude of the biological and preference parameters. For
example, an increase in infectivity  will cause the susceptibles to decrease more sharply
and the recovered to increase more sharply. Similarly, the more severe the disease is, as
measured by lower ow utility while infected I , will likewise make susceptibles decrease
faster and that of the recovered increase faster. The linear segments on the S(t) and
R(t) curves can be veried in Figures 4 and 6.
Next, consider how a change in the preference parameters inuences the social dis-
tancing decisions in equilibrium and how they alter the trajectory of the disease over
time. We will do this in terms of e¤ects on peak prevalence and on the duration of the
plateau phase with elevated disease prevalence. To trace the e¤ects of changes in the
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Figure 4: Paths of susceptible individuals across epidemic. Dashed curve shows path in
epidemiological model; solid curve shows equilibrium path in economic model.
Figure 5: Paths of infected individuals across epidemic. Dashed curve shows path in
epidemiological model; solid curve shows equilibrium path in economic model.
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Figure 6: Paths of recovered individuals across epidemic. Dashed curve shows path in
epidemiological model; solid curve shows equilibrium path in economic model.
preference parameters, we can simply determine how they inuence the critical threshold
I and then see what e¤ect this has on the aggregate dynamics. Since the method of
analysis is the same for each of the parameters, I will perform this exercise only for a
change in the ow payo¤ I that an individual earns when it is infected. This case is
illustrated in Figure 7, which shows the e¤ects on the trajectory of infected people when
I is lowered. This corresponds to making the disease more severe in that it has more
dire health consequences. All other parameters are kept xed. The benchmark case is
shown as a solid black curve while the modied case is shown as a solid blue curve. The
dashed black curve shows the uncontrolled benchmark for reference. Because the disease
is now more severe, individuals have reduced tolerance to infection. This is reected in a
downward shift in the critical threshold I. But this means that social distancing kicks in
earlier in equilibrium and also serves to extend the duration of the epidemic (in the sense
described earlier). As will be explored further below, this also has consequences for the
limiting distribution of the epidemic. As will become clear, although the phase of rela-
tively high disease prevalence is thus increased, the actual number of infected individuals
across the epidemic (i.e. cumulative incidence) actually decreases.
Analysis of the limiting distribution. Till now, I have focused on the evolution
of the epidemic across time, which is useful to analyze inter-dependencies between the
compartments, growth rates and time-domain properties of the disease. But the time
dimension is less useful for determining the limiting properties of the disease, such as the
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Figure 7: How parameters change the intensity and duration of the epidemic under
equilibrium social distancing. Plot shows the evolution of susceptible individuals in the
benchmark model in solid black and the evolution when the disease is more severe (I is
lower) in solid blue.
cumulative incidence (i.e. the total number of infected individuals across the epidemic)
and how the eventual number of immune and susceptible individuals depend on the initial
conditions. For that purpose, and to further compare the equilibrium disease dynamics
with social distancing to those under the uncontrolled biological model, it is useful to
consider the evolution of infections in the (S(t); I(t))-plane. This is done in Figure 8.
For an arbitrary point in this diagram, the measure of recovered individuals R(t) is
residually determined. For this purpose, note that the dynamics in (S(t); I(t))-space are
characterized by the equation9
I(t) = S0 + I0   S(t) + 

log

S(t)
S0

(27)
To understand the gure, assume that R0 = 0 and pick an initial point (S0; I0). This
point is denoted by a on the curve. I will rst describe the uncontrolled dynamics in the
absence of social distancing and then contrast them with the dynamics in equilibrium.
Starting from the initial point a, infection picks up and the susceptible population de-
creases, moving the state of the system along the dashed curve peaking at point f and
ending in some point (S(1); I(1)), denoted by g. There are two important points to
9See Hethcote and Waltman (1973), who uses this type of diagram to illustrate the e¤ects of an initial
pulse vaccination of a fraction of the susceptible population.
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notice.
First, the curve showing the uncontrolled dynamics has its maximum at S(t) = =,
irrespective of the initial condition. In other words, all the curves describing the epidemic
in (S(t); I(t))-plane achieve their maximum at the same value of susceptibles. This will
turn out to be important for the characterization of the equilibrium dynamics. If one
chooses another initial state (S 00; I
0
0) with I
0
0 > I0, indicated by e, then the resulting curve
is simply shifted upwards and never intersects the initial curve. The dynamics under this
higher initial disease prevalence settles on a lower value for S(1), as can be veried from
the equation that characterizes the nal distribution. But note that the shifted curve
also has its maximum at S(t) = =.
Second, generically, the curves intersect the S(t)-axis at a point (S(1); I(1)) at
which I(1) = 0 and S(1) > 0. In other words, the disease dies out asymptotically,
some individuals remain susceptible and R(1) = 1 S(1) become infected at some point
during the epidemic but eventually recover. The limiting fraction R(1) measures the
aggregate incidence (or total case count) of the epidemic. Next, consider the movement
along the I(t)-dimension. As is clear from the curve, infection initially increases to the
point when S(t) = = and then decreases.
It is important to emphasize that the speeds along these di¤erent uncontrolled disease
curves di¤er and depend on the initial conditions and the parameters  and  (see Het-
hcote and Waltman, 1973 for details). As will be shown below, the speed of movement
in equilibrium is lower than that in the biological model, as social distancing serves to
reduce the speed by suppressing disease incidence.
Next, I turn to the dynamics under endogenous social distancing. In Figure 8, I plot
the horizontal line corresponding to the equilibrium cuto¤ I < I. In equilibrium, the
initial dynamics from the point a coincide with those of the biological model until the
point b, where I(t) = I. At that point, the equilibrium and uncontrolled biological
paths diverge as the individuals start to socially distance themselves. They do so to
an extent that keeps I(t) constant at the critical level. Thus in equilibrium after the
initial stage, the dynamics move horizontally leftward till the point c, at which no further
social distancing is desired by the individuals. As described above, this happens when
the infection becomes naturally decreasing. But on the diagram, one readily veries this
must happen at a point where S(t) = =. Thus once point c is reached, individuals
cease social distancing and thus the dynamics going forward coincide with those of the
uncontrolled biological model but with the modied initial condition (S0; I0) = (=; I).
The equilibrium path thus ends at point d, which can be conrmed to lie strictly to the
right of point g.
In both the uncontrolled biological model and in the model with social distancing,
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Figure 8: Disease dynamics in the (S(t); I(t))-plane. Dashed curve shows path in epi-
demiological model; solid curve shows equilibrium path in economic model.
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the infection dies out only asymptotically. Thus the end of the disease cannot be said
to occur faster under social distancing than it otherwise would have under a purely
non-behavioral model. What is possible though is to determine when the disease starts
decreasing naturally under the two scenarios. In the diagram, it is clear that this happens
when the fraction of remaining susceptibles reaches the critical threshold =. But note
that along the uncontrolled biological trajectory, the speed of movement along the curve
in the (S(t); I(t))-plane is
_S(t) =  I(t)S(t) (28)
=  

S0 + I0   S(t) + 

log

S(t)
S0

S(t) (29)
In contrast, during the social distancing phase, the speed of movement is
_S(t) =  IS(t) (30)
But since I(t)  I for all t  0, it follows that the starting point of declining infection
happens with a delay under social distancing. Another way to see that infection is
suppressed under social distancing is to recall that in the uncontrolled biological model,
the churn rate is
S(t)

(31)
In other words, each individual who recovers is replaced by S(s)= new infected indi-
viduals. The dependence of this conversion ratio on the fraction of susceptibles S(t) is
exactly what causes infection to rst increase and then decrease. In contrast, under social
distancing, the churn rate is
"(t)S(t)

=

S(t)
S(t)

= 1 (32)
In other words, equilibrium exposure is set such that each individual who recovers is
replaced by exactly one new individual who is infected.
The suppression of incidence in equilibrium also has e¤ects on the progression of
susceptible and recovered individuals. Once social distancing kicks in, as fewer people
become infected, the measure of susceptibles declines less steeply. At the same time, the
measure of recovered grows less rapidly.
Note that since the curves in the (S(t); I(t))-plane do not intersect, we can use the
intersection between the lines I(t) = I and S(t) = = to determine the e¤ects of changes
in parameters on the nal size distribution. E.g., for two distinct such intersection points
(which di¤er because we vary one of the underlying parameters), we can rank the resulting
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 c  S I R
S(1) +   +/ +  
R(1)  + + /+  + +
S(1)  + 0 0 0 0 0
R(1) +  0 0 0 0 0
Table 2: Comparative statics of nal size distributions.
limiting distributions by following the curves from the initial intersection points to the
S(t)-axis to nd the corresponding S(1)-values.
Using the comparative statics of the critical threshold I in Table 1, we nd the
corresponding e¤ects that the biological and preference parameters have on the nal size
distribution in the uncontrolled biological model and in the equilibrium in the economic
model. These are given in Table 2.
These comparative statics again show that the results from the equilibrium model may
reverse those of the uncontrolled biological model. For example, increasing infectiousness
 or decreasing the recovery rate  leads to higher cumulative incidence in the biological
model but to lower cumulative incidence in the economic model. The comparative statics
with respect to the preference parameters have no biological counterpart and so for these,
no comparison is possible.
4. Discussion
This paper has considered the equilibrium amount of social distancing in the context of the
well-known SIR epidemiological model. While simple, this model allows for an intuitive
and clean analysis of the tradeo¤s involved in individuals decision-making on social
distancing. There are several ways in which the analysis can be enriched. First, rather
than consider a linear cost of social distancing, other cost structures can be considered.
The main insights are robust to this extension. With increasing convex costs of social
distancing, individuals would continually adjust to increasing disease prevalence in the
population.10 Second, the paper has not o¤ered a full welfare analysis of the equilibrium.
It is immediately clear that the equilibrium is in fact not social welfare maximizing.
The reasons is a classical one in this type of model, namely that the individuals in the
population do not internalize the positive externalities owing from social distancing.
Third, and most interestingly, the analysis has been based on the assumption of a well-
mixed population in which all that matters are the fractions of susceptible, infected and
recovered. A richer model would consider a population with explicit social structure.
This would open up for the possibility that the incentives to socially distance oneself may
10Note also that although costs (and thus the current-value Hamiltonian) is linear, the symmetric
equilibrium is characterised by a singular solution during the social distancing phase. Thus exposure
levels in fact vary continuously with the state during this phase.
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depend on ones position in the social network. Such an analysis may also be useful in
informing policy, such as the socially optimal design and micro-targeting of quarantines.
Last, the population in this model has been assumed to be homogeneous. With a pop-
ulation that is heterogeneous along some dimension, the qualitative nature of the analysis
would be similar, but aggregate social distancing would change more continuously, creat-
ing a gradual increase and subsequent decrease in social distancing. To see this, suppose
that individuals were heterogeneous in how much they su¤ered from infection. In that
case, di¤erent individuals would have di¤erent tolerances to infection risk and this would
mean that each individual would start socially distance itself at di¤erent levels of disease
prevalence. Initially, only the very risk intolerant in the population would start socially
distancing but as prevalence increases further, additional individuals would join them. In
this manner, aggregate social distancing would be phased in more smoothly than in the
homogeneous population case, in which all switch to social distancing at the same time.
The heterogeneous population case also suggests the interesting possibility of free-riding
by the more risk tolerant on the e¤orts of the less risk tolerant. As the latter start socially
distancing themselves, disease incidence is curbed somewhat, thus protecting those indi-
viduals who have not yet reached their individual social distancing thresholds. In fact,
disease prevalence may be curbed so much by the initial social distancing e¤orts of the
risk intolerant that the most tolerant may never have to engage in any social distancing
and they would in e¤ect be free-riding on the preventive e¤orts of those who do.
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A. Appendix
In this Appendix, I derive the value of transitioning into the infected state. Let the
recovery date for an infected individual be denoted by T . This date arrives according to
a Poisson process with rate   0.
The value we seek to characterize, namely the net present value of being infected at
instant t  0 is
VI =
Z T
t
e uIdu+
Z 1
T
e uRdu (33)
Consider a utility ow  which can take two values, I and R. At time t, the utility
ow starts o¤with  = I . Over the time interval [t; t+dt), the probability of the utility
ow switching to R is dt and so the probability of the utility ow not switching R is
1  dt. Dene
V tI = Et
Z 1
t
e (u t)sudu (34)
and assume that st = I . We do so because for the case where st = R, we know that
the utility ow gets stuck at R and so
Et
Z 1
t
e (u t)Rdu = REt
Z 1
t
e (u t)du =
R

(35)
Observe also that V tI is independent of t, by virtue of the innite horizon and so V
t
I = VI .
Therefore
VI = Idt+ (1  dt)e dtVI + dte dtR

(36)
VI = Idt+ [1  (+ )dt]VI + dtR

+ o(dt) (37)
0 = Idt  (+ )VIdt+ dtR

+ o(dt)VIdt =
I +  R
+ 
dt+ o(dt): (38)
In the continuous-time limit, we obtain
VI =
1
+ 

I + 
R


(39)
and the result follows 
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Figure 9: Paths of susceptible, infected and recovered individuals across epidemic. Dashed
curves shows paths in epidemiological model; solid curves show equilibrium paths in
economic model.
